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If We Don’t Bring Them to Court, the
Terrorists Will Have Won
REINVIGORATING THE ANTI-TERRORIST ACT AND
GENERAL JURISDICTION IN A POST-DAIMLER ERA
INTRODUCTION
For decades, hundreds of Americans have been injured
or killed in terrorist attacks at home or abroad.1 Over that
period, the American legislature has been firmly committed to
bringing terrorists, and their sponsors, who attack Americans
to justice in American courts.2 In 2013 alone, according to the
United States Department of State, at least thirty-five Americans
were injured, killed, or kidnapped by terrorists while abroad.3
Recently, on July 7, 2016, Sean Copeland and his eleven-year-
old son Brodie were killed in the Nice, France terror attack4
perpetrated by a “soldier” of ISIS.5 The Copelands, like all other
Americans, should be able to find justice at home.
Americans should always be able to bring those who
terrorize them to court, but the Supreme Court’s recent
1 BRENDA J. LUTZ & JAMES M. LUTZ, TERRORISM IN AMERICA 49 (2007); see
also 137 CONG. REC. 3304 (1991) (statement of Sen. Grassley) (In the first “10 months
since the ATA has been introduced. . . . there have been more than 70 reported acts of
terrorism committed against Americans . . . around the world.”).
2 It is clear Congress remains committed to allowing American litigants to
sue their terror attackers or sponsors. For instance, on September 30, 2016, the United
States Senate overrode a presidential veto to pass a controversial bill, the Justice
Against Sponsors of Terror Act, which would allow American litigants to sue the Saudi
government for any involvement in the September 11, 2001 terror attacks despite the
Obama administration’s strong stance against the bill. See Jennifer Steinhauer et al.,
Congress Votes to Override Obama Veto on 9/11 Victims Bill, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/29/us/politics/senate-votes-to-override-obama-veto-on-9-11-
victims-bill.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/6QGJ-7XH5]; see also Justice Against Sponsors of
Terrorism Act, S 2040, 114th Cong. (2016) (enacted).
3 Terrorism Deaths, Injuries and Kidnappings of Private U.S. Citizens
Overseas in 2013, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224833.htm
[https://perma.cc/ZCP7-3DHN].
4 Ray Sanchez, Attack in Nice: Texas Father and Son, 11, Among Victims,
CNN (July 15, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/15/europe/nice-attack-american-
victims/ [https://perma.cc/DZP7-ZE69].
5 Alissa J. Rubin & Aurelien Breeden, ISIS Claims Truck Attacker in France
Was Its ‘Soldier’, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/17/world/
europe/isis-nice-france-attack.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/54E6-RHP8].
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decisions in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations S.A. v. Brown6
and Daimler AG. v. Bauman7 have complicated their ability to
do so. In Goodyear and Daimler the Supreme Court clearly
established that in order for a foreign defendant to be subject to
general jurisdiction in American courts, the defendant must be
“essentially at home” in the United States. Terrorist organizations
and their sponsors, however, are a unique subset of foreign
defendants, and American courts have reached different results
when tasked with determining whether they can exercise
general jurisdiction over such defendants.
Consider the tragic story of the Sokolow family. On
January 27, 2002, Mark Sokolow and his family, Americans,
were visiting their oldest daughter in Israel.8 While on their
visit, a suicide bomber working on behalf of the Palestine
Liberation Organization (the PLO) and the Palestinian
Authority (the PA)9 walked to Jaffa Street in downtown
Jerusalem and at 12:30pm, she detonated an explosive device
killing one elderly man and injuring over 150 other
individuals.10 As a consequence of the explosion, Rena Sokolow,
Mark’s wife, was knocked to the ground “with her leg bleeding
profusely and a bone sticking out.”11 As she was on the ground
she said she “saw a woman’s severed head lying about three
feet away [from her].”12 The Sokolows’ youngest daughter
Jamie said her “whole face felt like it was on fire,” and she
ultimately “suffered a severe eye injury.”13 In 2005, the
Sokolows and about forty other plaintiffs filed suit in the
Southern District of New York against the PA and the PLO14
pursuant to the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1992 (ATA).15 After
nearly a decade of protracted litigation, the plaintiffs prevailed
6 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011).
7 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
8 Benjamin Weiser, Palestinian Groups Are Found Liable at Manhattan Terror
Trial, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/24/nyregion/damages-
awarded-in-terror-case-against-palestinian-groups.html [https://perma.cc/UK4N-KABN].
9 The Palestinian Authority may interchangeably be referred to as the
Palestinian National Authority. See Palestinian Authority (PA), ENCYC. BRITANNICA
http://www.britannica.com/topic/Palestinian-Authority [https://perma.cc/F4RH-6JYR].
10 First Amended Complaint at 17–18, Sokolow v. Palestine Liberation Org.,
2011 WL 1345086 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2011) (No. 04 CV 00397(GBD)).
11 Weiser, supra note 8.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 First Amended Complaint, supra note 10, at *1–5.
15 18 U.S.C. §§ 2333, 2334 (2012). The Antiterrorism Act of 1992 was passed in
response to a 1985 terror attack where the PLO shot and killed an American aboard an
Italian cruise liner sailing in the Mediterranean. When Congress passed the ATA they
did so to deter and punish acts of international terrorism by removing jurisdictional
hurdles to empower American victims of terror attacks to get justice in American courts.
For an in-depth discussion of the ATA see infra Section I.C.
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in their suit against the PA and the PLO and won a staggering
judgment in the amount of $655.5 million in treble damages,
non-inclusive of court costs and attorney’s fees.16 With all
relevant fees and interest considered, the judgment may
amount to as much as $1.15 billion.17
In 2011, the Sokolow court concluded it could consider
the PA and the PLO as “essentially at home” in America18
despite the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent 2011 and 2014 rulings
in Goodyear and Daimler, respectively, and thus let the
Sokolows’ case proceed. But not all courts have agreed with the
Southern District’s approach; thus, some terror victims have
had their cases dismissed with prejudice for want of general
personal jurisdiction by United States District Courts and have
been left without remedy.19
For instance, consider the case of Esther Klieman. On
March 24, 2002, Ms. Klieman, an American schoolteacher, was
shot and killed by terrorists affiliated with the PA and the PLO
when they attacked a public bus with machine guns near Neve
Tzuf in Israel.20 In 2004, Ms. Klieman’s estate filed her case in
the District Court for the District of Columbia.21 In Estate of
Klieman v. Palestinian Authority, the District Court for the
District of Columbia decided that the PA and the PLO were
16 Judgment at 7, Sokolow v. Palestine Liberation Org., 2011 WL 1345086
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2011) (No. 04 CV 00397(GBD)). The lawsuit in Sokolow was filed on
behalf of about forty interested plaintiffs, and thus, the awarded $655.5 million dollars
will be split amongst a number of plaintiffs. See First Amended Complaint, supra note
10, at *1–5, Sokolow, 2011 WL 1345086; Judgment, supra, at 7.
17 See Brooke Singman, Obama Admin Mulling Intervention in Massive
Judgment Against Palestinians in Terror Case, FOX NEWS (Aug. 03, 2015), http://www.
foxnews.com/politics/2015/08/03/white-house-mulling-intervention-in-massive-judgment-
against-palestinians-in/ [https://perma.cc/RAV9-2H7B].
18 Sokolow v. Palestine Liberation Org., 2014 WL 6811395, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 1, 2014); see also Estates of Ungar ex rel. Strachman v. Palestinian Auth., 153 F.
Supp. 2d 76, 87–88 (D.R.I. 2001) (recognizing the purpose of the United States contacts
test is intended to “geographically expand[]” the power of federal courts. The court
recognized the facts that the PLO maintains offices in Washington D.C. headed by
individuals affiliated with both the PLO and the PA, the PLO and PA spend a
significant amount of money on advocacy activities, and conduct significant fundraising
and lobbying activities sufficient to subject them to general jurisdiction in American
courts.); Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 937 F.2d 44, 51 (2d Cir. 1991) (PA and
PLO’s non-UN based activities in the United States could be used as a basis to exercise
personal jurisdiction against the organizations.).
19 Legal Considerations: Enforcement of Judgments, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
http://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/legal-considerations/judicial/enforcement-of-judg
ments.html [https://perma.cc/YG7C-DLAC]; see Estate of Klieman v. Palestinian Auth.,
82 F. Supp. 3d 237, 250 (D.D.C. 2015) (“[T]his case will be dismissed with prejudice . . . .”);
see also Livant v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 19, 37 (D.D.C. 2015) (“[T]his Court
does not have personal jurisdiction . . . [a]ccordingly all claims are dismissed . . . .”); Safra v.
Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 37, 55 (D.D.C. 2015) (“[T]his Court does not have personal
jurisdiction . . . . [a]ccordingly, all claims are dismissed.”).
20 Estate of Klieman, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 240.
21 Id.
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subject to such general jurisdiction in the District Court for the
District of Columbia due to “their ‘continuous and systematic’
contacts with the United States.”22 However, following the
Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Daimler, the PA and the PLO
moved for the district court to reconsider its decision on the
grounds that Daimler constituted an intervening change in the
law,23 specifically, that the court never considered whether the
PA and the PLO are “essentially at home” in the United
States.24 The court agreed with the PA and PLO’s argument
that Daimler represented such a change in general personal
jurisdiction law and further agreed that the court had not
previously considered whether the PA and PLO were “essentially
at home” in the United States.25 In light of this new standard, the
court concluded that it could no longer exercise general
jurisdiction over the PA and the PLO despite its previous 2006
decision to the contrary.26 The district court judge then dismissed
the case with prejudice27 and denied Ms. Klieman’s estate justly
deserved relief in any United States court.
Similarly, in Livnat, the District Court for the District
of Columbia disagreed with the application of Daimler by the
Southern District of New York in Sokolow.28 In Livnat, U.S.
citizens were killed or injured following an attack at a Jewish
holy site that was orchestrated and carried out by the PLO.29
The diametrically different treatments of Daimler by courts in
the Second and D.C. Circuits has teed this issue up for a circuit
split,30 but more importantly, plaintiffs who have been injured
by horrific PLO- and PA-sponsored terrorist attacks abroad are
22 Id. at 239–40.
23 Id. (“In light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Daimler . . . the PA and
the PLO again move for reconsideration of this Court’s rulings on personal jurisdiction.”
(internal citation omitted)). Courts may reconsider prior holdings or interlocutory orders if
there is “(1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence; or
(3) the need to correct clear error or to prevent manifest injustice.” Wash. Nat’l Life Ins. Co.
v. Morgan Stanley & Co. Inc., 974 F. Supp. 214, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). An intervening change
in the law “occur[s] when the law has been changed by a body with greater authority on [an]
issue.” 18B CHARLES ALANWRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4478 (2d
ed. 1987). Such a change can be caused by a higher court, or by a statutory or equivalent
enactment. Id.
24 Estate of Klieman, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 242.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 250.
27 Id.
28 Livnat v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 19, 31 (D.D.C. 2015). While the
Second Circuit found the PA and PLO “essentially at home” in Sokolow, the D.C. Circuit
applied Daimler differently and concluded general jurisdiction may not be exercised over
these defendants. Id.
29 See id. at 20–21.
30 Julie Triedman, A Split over Terror Suits, THE AM. LAWYER (Apr. 27,
2015), http://www.americanlawyer.com/id=1202724025697/A-Split-Over-Terror-Suits?s
lreturn=20160022131155 [https://perma.cc/P9DM-R5UL].
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being denied relief against these organizations. Sokolow,
Klieman, and Livnat are each currently being appealed.31
This note begins by offering background on the history
of the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestinian
Authority in Part I, with particular emphasis on how these
entities are treated by American courts. This part then explains
specific personal jurisdiction and general personal jurisdiction
and discusses the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1992. Part II of this note
highlights how the United States District Courts for the District
of Columbia and Southern District of New York have treated
the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Daimler AG v. Bauman
with regard to defendants like the PA and the PLO, and how
their differing treatments have led to drastically different
results for plaintiffs in their respective jurisdictions. While the
Southern District of New York held that the PA and PLO are
subject to general jurisdiction in United States District Courts,
the District Court for the District of Columbia treated Daimler
as an intervening change in general jurisdiction law such that
American plaintiffs, injured or killed in terrorist attacks abroad,
are afforded no avenue for relief in United States courts.32 In
some instances, this has led to plaintiffs’ cases being dismissed
with prejudice, effectively ending—without remedy—costly cases
that are often at least a decade old.33 By the time of dismissal,
plaintiffs or their estates will have spent tens of thousands of
dollars litigating these cases with no relief, leaving the already
injured plaintiffs worse off than they were before.
31 Livnat, 82 F. Supp. 3d 19, appeal docketed, No. 15-7024 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 18,
2015); Estate of Klieman, 82 F. Supp. 3d 237, appeal docketed, No. 15-7034 (D.C. Cir.
Apr. 8, 2015). On August 31, 2016, the Second Circuit decided the Sokolow appeal in
Waldman v. Palestine Liberation Organization, 835 F.3d 317 (2d Cir. 2016). The
Second Circuit vacated the judgment of the District Court after finding that while
“[t]he terror machine gun attacks and suicide bombings that triggered this
suit . . . were unquestionably horrific. . . . The district court could not constitutionally
exercise either general or specific jurisdiction over the defendants in this case.” Id. at
344. On remand the Second Circuit has instructed the district court to “dismiss the
case for want of jurisdiction.” Id. After this opinion, plaintiffs injured in terror attacks
will continue to be without recourse in American federal courts. This note, which
already took the position that the Southern District’s reasoning was incorrect remains
important because the Second Circuit’s decision in Waldman fails to provide an avenue
of domestic recourse for American terror victims. Thus, the jurisdictional issues
preventing Americans from suing their terror attackers and those who sponsor them in
the post-Daimler era remain unresolved. See Part II.
32 See, e.g., Estate of Klieman, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 250 (dismissing case with
prejudice due to lack of jurisdiction).
33 See, e.g., id. (complaint filed in 2004); see also Sokolow v. Palestine
Liberation Org., No. 04 Civ. 397(GBD), 2014 WL 6811395 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2014)
(complaint filed in 2005). Klieman was ultimately dismissed in 2015. Estate of Klieman,
82 F. Supp. 3d at 250. Sokolow was resolved in 2015. Sokolow v. Palestine Liberation
Org., 04 CIVIL 00397 (GBD), 2015 WL 10852003 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2015).
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Part III of this note proposes two solutions for the general
jurisdiction problem created by Daimler. First, courts should limit
application of the general jurisdiction framework to individuals
and corporations as the Supreme Court has not specifically
extended this framework beyond these types of associations.
Specifically, lower federal courts could choose not to apply the
general personal jurisdiction framework to unincorporated
associations and non-sovereign state organizations; a solution
likely more workable in the context of non-sovereign state
organizations. Second, and perhaps more compelling, is that cases
against the PA, the PLO, and any similarly situated
organizations should be treated as the type of “exceptional case”
alluded to in Footnote 19 of Daimler. Public policy strongly favors
that the courts find a way to exercise general jurisdiction over
terrorists and sponsors of terror, especially in light of the
congressional intent recorded during the passage of the Anti-
Terrorism Act of 1992. The fact that Americans who have already
been injured abroad would be further injured, but this time by the
American judiciary in the post-Daimler era is an unacceptable
result and must be addressed.
I. BACKGROUND ON THE PA AND PLO, GENERAL AND
SPECIFIC JURISDICTION, AND THE ATA
A. History and Recognition of the PA and the PLO
In 1964 the Palestine Liberation Organization was
founded with the purpose to “mobilize the Palestinian people to
recover their usurped homeland.”34 The PLO was formed in
response the open question of Palestine’s place in inter-Arab
politics, and the growth of Palestinian nationalist activity.35 In
1974, the Arab League, a confederation of twenty-two Arab
nations,36 “recognized the PLO as the sole ‘legitimate
representative of the Palestinian people.’”37 Since then, the
34 Arabs Create Organization for Recovery of Palestine, N.Y. TIMES, May 29,
1964, at A5.
35 Glenn E. Robinson, Palestine Liberation Organization, THE OXFORD
ENCYC. OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD, http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t236/e
0618#DevelopmentofthePLO [https://perma.cc/YXN3-X2E4].
36 Jonathan Masters & Mohammed Aly Sergie, The Arab League, COUNCIL
ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Oct. 21, 2014), http://www.cfr.org/middle-east-and-north-
africa/arab-league/p25967 [https://perma.cc/ZQ4L-ZSTM].
37 Palestine Liberation Organization, PERMANENT OBSERVER MISSION OF THE
STATE OF PALESTINE TO THE UNITED NATIONS N.Y., http://palestineun.org/about-palestine/
palestine-liberation-organization/ [https://perma.cc/7UV8-ZXR2]; see also Niyazi Gunay,
Arab League Summit Conferences, 1964–2000, THEWASH. INST. (Oct. 19, 2000), http://www.
washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/arab-league-summit-conferences-196420
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PLO has represented Palestine at the United Nations and in
other forums.38
The Palestinian Authority is a governing organization for
Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.39 The PA was
formed in 1994 as part of an agreement reached between the
PLO and Israel during secret peace talks.40 During these talks,
Israel and the PLO agreed that governance in the West Bank
and Gaza would be handed over to Palestinian officials and
thus the PLO formed the PA to handle governance in those
areas.41 Under this agreement, the territories effectively
remained under Israeli control while the PA received limited
self-governance capabilities.42 In 2011, Mahmoud Abbas, the
President of the PA, requested that the UN Security Council
recognize the existence of an individual Palestinian state, but
his request was denied, in part, because the United States
vowed to veto such a request.43 However, on November 29, 2012,
the PA gained implicit recognition of Palestinian statehood
when the UN upgraded its status from “permanent observer” to
“nonmember observer state.”44 Permanent observers only have
access to certain documents and meetings, but nonmember
observer states may maintain permanent missions at the UN
and participate as observers in the work of the General
Assembly.45 Palestine’s classification as a “nonmember observer
state” could have interesting jurisdictional implications for the
PA and the PLO in the future as Palestine moves closer
towards internationally recognized statehood, but at present
the PA remains a stateless government organization in the
00 [https://perma.cc/ZNS5-U73D] (At the second Arab League Summit in 1964 the “Summit
formally approved the establishment of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO).”).
38 Palestine Liberation Organization, supra note 37.
39 Palestinian Authority (PA), ENCYC. BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/
topic/Palestinian-Authority [https://perma.cc/F4RH-6JYR] (last updated Nov. 30, 2012).
40 Id.
41 Id.; see Sokolow v. Palestine Liberation Org., 60 F. Supp. 3d 509, 513
(S.D.N.Y. 2014).
42 West Bank, THE ENCYC. BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/place/West-
Bank [https://perma.cc/42JL-TEYK] (last updated Jan. 13, 2016); Gaza Strip, THE
COLUMBIA ELEC. ENCYC., http://www.infoplease.com/encyclopedia/world/gaza-strip-history.
html [https://perma.cc/YNG9-US7T].
43 West Bank, supra note 42.
44 Non-member States, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/sections/member-
states/non-member-states/index.html [https://perma.cc/CB7W-Q6VU] (The Holy See is the
only other non-member observer state recognized by the UN.).
45 About Permanent Observers, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/
sections/member-states/about-permanent-observers/index.html [https://perma.cc/WYS9-V
48D]; Non-member States, supra note 44.
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eyes of the United States and many of its Western allies.46 For
purposes of jurisdiction in United States courts, the PA and
PLO, in their current posture, should be viewed as stateless
with no home, or non-sovereign state organizations.
In terms of treatment of the PA and the PLO in United
States District Courts, most courts have held that the United
States—which does not recognize Palestine as a state—should
treat the PA and PLO as unincorporated associations
“without . . . legal identit[ies] apart from [their] membership[s],
formed for specific objectives.”47 Typically, for purposes of
jurisdiction and service of process, unincorporated associations
are treated as present in all localities where they have
members.48 Therefore, both the PA and PLO only have legal
identity jurisdictionally in the United States where its members
may be found. However, legal identity is not enough to make the
PA and PLO answerable in United States courts. Even where
legal identity exists, these organizations can only be made to
answer in United States District Courts if a causal relationship
exists between the organizations’ United States contacts and the
suit in question.49 The PA and PLO’s lobbying activity in the
United States is insufficient to support personal jurisdiction for
terror-related trials because the former is not a proper basis of
jurisdiction for the latter as the two are unrelated.50
At least one district court has argued that the PA and
PLO would be better classified and treated by United States
District Courts as non-sovereign state organizations rather
than unincorporated associations. In Livnat v. Palestinian
Authority, the D.C. District Court suggested as non-sovereign
46 Evan Bartlett, Here Are All the Countries That Recognise Palestinian
Statehood, THE INDEP., https://www.indy100.com/article/here-are-all-the-countries-that-
recognise-palestinian-statehood--xkVle9I-8e [https://perma.cc/PJ86-CDMU].
47 Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro Ed, 739 F. Supp. 854, 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1990);
see also Sokolow v. Palestine Liberation Org., 60 F. Supp. 3d 509, 523–24 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
(The PA and PLO “are most appropriately treated as unincorporated associations.”); see also
Estates of Unger ex rel. Strachman v. Palestinian Auth., 153 F. Supp. 2d 76, 89 (D.R.I 2001)
(“It has previously been determined that the PLO qualifies as an unincorporated
association . . . .”).
48 Karl Oakes, Annotation, Unincorporated Associations, 29A Fed. Proc., Law.’s
ed. § 69:37 (2016).
49 See infra Section I.B for a discussion on the difficulties presented in
trying to exercise specific personal jurisdiction or general personal jurisdiction over
the PA or the PLO.
50 Waldman v. Palestine Liberation Org., 835 F.3d 317, 342 (2d Cir. 2016)
(“[T]he connections the [PA and PLO] do have with the United States—the Washington,
D.C. and New York missions—revolve around lobbying activities that are not proscribed
by the ATA and are not connected to the wrongs for which the plaintiffs here seek
redress.” Therefore, the Second Circuit found, deciding the Sokolow appeal in
Waldman, that the PA and PLO’s lobbying activity in the United States is insufficient
to support specific jurisdiction over these organizations in terror trials.).
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state organizations the PA and PLO “should be amenable to
suit for all purposes [in] the place where it governs . . . [T]he
West Bank, not the United States.”51 Under this theory, the D.C.
District Court suggested the PA and PLO would only be “at
home” in the West Bank and could not be brought into United
States courts under a theory of general jurisdiction.52 Rather,
plaintiffs would have to rely on a theory of specific jurisdiction
to bring suit against the PA and PLO in United States
District Courts.
While the lack of a United States recognized Palestinian
state prevents the United States from recognizing the PA and
the PLO as state sponsors of terror, the United States does
recognize the PA and the PLO as sponsors of terror activities.53
As recognized sponsors of terror activity, issues with
jurisdiction over the PA and PLO are not going away and thus
finding a workable solution so American terror victims can get
relief in United States courts remains important. For instance,
in the early 2000s, Yasser Arafat, then president of the PA and
chairman of the PLO, redirected PA funds to groups like the al-
Aqsa Martyr’s Brigade who were known to carry out terror
activities in Israel.54 The al-Aqsa Martyr’s Brigade has been
formally classified as a terrorist group by the United States
government and “operate[s] from [within] Palestinian-ruled
territories” with support from the PA and PLO.55 Not only do
the PA and PLO allow terrorist organizations to operate within
their territories, but they also provide these organizations
51 Livnat v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 19, 30 (D.D.C. 2015).
52 Id. See infra Section I.B.2 for discussion on the limitations of the general
jurisdiction framework.
53 Matthew Levitt, Targeting Terror: U.S. Policy Toward Middle Eastern State
Sponsors and Terrorist Organizations, Post-September 11, THE WASH. INST. (Oct. 2002),
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/targeting-terror-u.s.-policy-toward-
middle-eastern-state-sponsors-and-terro [https://perma.cc/H9SV-6MCE]; Terrorism Havens:
Palestinian Authority, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, http://www.cfr.org/palestine/
terrorism-havens-palestinian-authority/p9515 [https://perma.cc/A486-XW2N] (last
updated Dec. 1, 2005); see also Benjamin Weiser, U.S. Requests Lower Bond for
Palestinian Appeal of Terror Case, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.
com/2015/08/11/nyregion/us-requests-lower-bond-for-palestinian-appeal-of-terror-
case.html [https://perma.cc/Z7KN-Z92F] (recognizing liability for PA and PLO’s role in
terror attacks in Israel).
54 Jonathan Schanzer, Huge Verdict Is the Price the Palestinian Authority
Pays for Not Controlling the P.L.O., N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/
roomfordebate/2015/02/24/terror-and-the-palestinian-authority/huge-verdict-is-the-price-
the-palestinian-authority-pays-for-not-controlling-the-plo [https://perma.cc/6L5G-67Q6];
see also Palestinian Authority Funds Go to Militants, B.B.C. NEWS (Nov. 7, 2003),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3243071.stm [https://perma.cc/4AVK-RJ2X] (A
BBC news investigation revealed that the PA was sending up to $50,000 to the al-Aqsa
Martyrs’ Brigade, a Palestinian militant group, that then used those funds to conduct
attacks against Israelis.).
55 Terrorism Havens: Palestinian Authority, supra note 53.
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monetary aid. When the PA and PLO knowingly and
deliberately provide money to terror organizations and those
terror organizations kill, maim, or otherwise injure Americans
abroad, it is only just that our courts are empowered to bring
them to justice.
B. Specific Personal Jurisdiction Versus General Personal
Jurisdiction
A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a
defendant in one of two ways: by exercising specific personal
jurisdiction or by exercising general personal jurisdiction.56
Personal jurisdiction refers generally to a court’s power to
exercise jurisdiction over a defendant consistent with the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.57 When seeking to exercise personal jurisdiction
over foreign defendants like the PA and the PLO who are “not
subject to jurisdiction in any state’s courts of general jurisdiction,”
courts may still exercise personal jurisdiction pursuant to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure so long as exercising jurisdiction
is “consistent with the United States Constitution.”58 In such a
context, courts look to that defendant’s contacts with the United
States as a whole, rather than with any particular state, to
judge whether they may constitutionally exercise jurisdiction
over that defendant.59
Specific jurisdiction refers to a tribunal’s authority over
a defendant based on that defendant’s activity in the particular
forum.60 General jurisdiction, however, recognizes certain
instances where a defendant’s contacts with a forum are so
numerous and substantial that the defendant can be made to
answer in that forum for any controversy, whether it arose out
56 This note uses the term “specific personal jurisdiction” interchangeably with
“specific jurisdiction.” The same treatment is afforded to “general personal jurisdiction”
and “general jurisdiction.”
57 U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Due Process Clause through the concept of
personal jurisdiction protects an individual’s liberty interest in not being forced to answer
for claims in a forum with which he has no connection. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewics,
471 U.S. 462, 471–72. Where a tribunal exercises authority over a defendant without
properly establishing personal jurisdiction, it has exceeded its powers under the Due
Process Clause. Id. at 472.
58 FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2).
59 Livnat v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 19, 25 (D.D.C. 2015)
(articulating the proper inquiry is with regard to the PA’s contacts with the United
States as a whole under the Fifth Amendment); see also Estates of Unger ex rel.
Strachman v. Palestinian Auth., 153 F. Supp. 2d 76, 87 (D.R.I. 2001) (articulating the
appropriate inquiry is with regard to the United States as a whole under the Fifth
Amendment).
60 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 754 (2014).
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of its activity there or not.61 In either case, the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment informs a court’s understanding
of jurisdiction, and requires the court to ask whether or not
terror groups or their sponsors like the PA and PLO have
sufficient contacts with the United States as a whole rather
than any specific jurisdiction.
A court may exercise specific jurisdiction over a defendant
if that defendant’s activity is “continuous and systematic” within
a forum, a more permissive standard than the “essentially at
home” language used in the general jurisdiction context.62 The
court also asks whether or not the defendant’s specific activity in
the forum gave rise to the suit before the court.63 In certain
circumstances, “the commission of certain ‘single or occasional
acts’ in a State may be sufficient to render a [defendant]
answerable in that State with respect to those acts, though not
with respect to matters unrelated to the forum connections.”64
When a court seeks to exercise general jurisdiction over
a defendant, it asserts that it has the power over said
defendant “to hear any and all claims” related to that
defendant’s activities in the respective jurisdiction.65 General
jurisdiction is much more expansive than specific jurisdiction.
In order to exercise general jurisdiction in the post-Goodyear
and Daimler era, a defendant’s “affiliations with the State in
which suit is brought [must be] so constant and pervasive ‘as to
render [the defendant] essentially at home in the forum state.’”66
The general jurisdiction standard is exacting and requires
significant amounts of contact between a defendant and a forum
for a court to exercise jurisdiction over the defendant.67
1. Inadequacy of Specific Jurisdiction
There are few instances in which a terrorist group, or its
sponsors, conducting an attack abroad would be subject to
61 Id.
62 See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 754–55 (comparing specific and general jurisdiction);
see also 4 CHARLES ALANWRIGHT ET AL., supra note 23, at § 1067.5 (stating generally that
the contacts required for the exercise of general jurisdiction are “substantially higher” than
the contacts required for the exercise of specific jurisdiction).
63 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011);
see also Int’l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (State may authorize personal
jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant if the defendant has “certain minimum contacts
with [the State] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.’” (alteration in original)).
64 Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2853.
65 Livnat v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 19, 25 (D.D.C. 2015).
66 Id. (quoting Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 751).
67 Ranza v. Nike, Inc., 793 F.3d 1059,1069 (9th Cir. 2015).
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specific jurisdiction in a United States District Court. This is
because often there is an insufficient connection between the
terror defendants and the desired forum in U.S. federal district
courts. For a district court to exercise specific jurisdiction over
a non-resident defendant, the defendant’s suit-related conduct
must have a substantial connection to the forum state.68
The Supreme Court explained the requisite connection
required in Walden v. Fiore.69 In Walden, the Supreme Court
held that in order to support a finding of specific jurisdiction,
courts must look to a “defendant’s contacts with the forum
State itself, not . . . with persons who reside there.”70 In
Walden, a DEA agent had seized money from travelers
connecting through Atlanta to their final destination of
Nevada.71 The travelers attempted to sue the DEA agent in
Nevada arguing he had established connections with the forum
by knowingly seizing money from them in Atlanta while
knowing their final destination. The Court held that Nevada
had no jurisdiction over the DEA agent, stating that contacts
with people who return to a jurisdiction are too random or
fortuitous to support a finding of specific jurisdiction against a
defendant who otherwise has no relationship with that
jurisdiction.72 To hold otherwise would mean defendants could
be subject to suit wherever a plaintiff decides to go, regardless
of the plaintiff’s connection with that jurisdiction. This would
create near limitless specific jurisdiction over defendants.73
Therefore, if the PA or the PLO sponsor a terrorist attack
abroad that injures an American citizen who then returns
home, the fact that the citizen lives in a jurisdiction in the
United States would be insufficient as the basis for a court to
exercise specific jurisdiction over either organization. Rather,
the PA and the PLO would have to direct a terror attack
towards a specific jurisdiction in the United States. The PA and
PLO are not directing terrorist activities towards the United
States, and without that type of action they will not be subject
to specific jurisdiction in United States District Courts.
There is another instance in which courts can exercise
specific jurisdiction over terror defendants like the PA and the
68 Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1121 (2014).
69 Id.
70 Id. at 1122.
71 Id. at 1119–20.
72 Id. at 1120, 1123.
73 See, e.g., id. at 1121–23 (The logical implication of focusing on the plaintiff as a
sufficient link between the defendant and a forum for the exercise of specific jurisdiction
means a defendant could be forced to litigate in any United States jurisdiction that the
plaintiff decides to travel to; thus, jurisdiction would be nearly limitless.).
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PLO. Courts have allowed plaintiffs to exercise specific
jurisdiction over some defendants when the defendant’s activity
was purposefully directed at the United States or its interests
abroad. For instance, inMwani v. Bin Laden,74 al-Qaeda bombed
the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, and the court found that
even though al-Qaeda had not directed its attack at the United
States in a traditional sense, “the defendant’s conduct . . . [is]
such that [defendant] should reasonably anticipate being haled
into [an American] court”75 because the defendant had directly
targeted American interests abroad. Under the reasoning in
Mwani, where a terrorist group exhibits a conscious
determination to direct their terrorist activities at the United
States or its interests abroad, they should expect and realize
that United States District Courts will exercise specific
jurisdiction over them. However, even under this more
expansive view of specific jurisdiction, the PA and the PLO will
still escape the jurisdiction of American courts when they
unintentionally injure Americans or American interests in
terror attacks abroad precisely because they did not consciously
direct those attacks at Americans or American interests.
American courts should have the power to exact justice for even
the unintended victims of terror abroad.
Specifically, the Mwani exception does not help the
plaintiffs in Livnat or Klieman. In both cases, the PA and PLO
did not target the United States or its interests abroad, but
rather American citizens were unintended casualties of
tensions between Israel and Palestine.76 Presently, this type of
contact is an insufficient basis for courts to exercise specific
jurisdiction over the PA and the PLO, and these plaintiffs have
had their claims dismissed with prejudice for lack of any type
of jurisdiction. Thus, in cases where America or American
interests abroad are not the target of terrorist attacks—but
Americans are injured abroad as collateral damage—those
Americans cannot bring their terrorist attackers into United
States District Courts for relief. Such acts will almost always
be too attenuated with the United States to be used as the
basis of specific jurisdiction. Consequently, specific jurisdiction
is almost never adequate to bring the PA and PLO into United
74 Mwani v. Bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
75 Id. at 12 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985)).
76 Livnat v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 19, 33 (D.D.C. 2015) (finding the
focal point of the harm caused by defendants was the West Bank or Israel); see also
Estate of Klieman v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 237, 248 (D.D.C. 2015) (rejecting
plaintiffs claim that foreseeable harms to Americans was sufficient for the exercise of
specific jurisdiction).
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States Courts. Prior to Daimler those plaintiffs were able to use
general jurisdiction to find relief against terrorists and their
sponsors in American courts.
2. The Daimler and Goodyear General Jurisdiction
Framework
Exercising general jurisdiction is often the only way to
bring terrorists and organizations that sponsor terrorism into
United States District Courts when they have injured American
citizens abroad. While specific jurisdiction gives courts
jurisdiction over defendants based on their acts or connections
giving rise to a cause of action in a particular forum, general
jurisdiction treats a party as amenable to any suit for any
reason in a forum where they are “essentially at home.”
The Supreme Court has spoken thoroughly on specific
jurisdiction from Pennoyer v. Neff,77 decided in 1877, through
Walden v. Fiore,78 decided in 2014. Yet only four decisions since
International Shoe, in 1945, have dealt with general jurisdiction.79
In the specific jurisdiction context, courts ask if a defendant’s
contacts with a forum are continuous and systematic, and even if
they are not, whether their activity in a forum was so substantial
as to render them subject to a court’s jurisdiction based on a
single activity alone.80 Comparatively, in the general jurisdiction
context, based on the Supreme Court’s most recent decisions in
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations S.A. v. Brown81 and Daimler
AG v. Bauman,82 courts must ask whether a defendant’s
activities or connections with a forum are so substantial so as to
render them “essentially at home” in that jurisdiction.83 While
this note focuses on terror groups and non-sovereign state
organizations which sponsor terror like the PA and PLO, the
“essentially at home” general jurisdiction standard developed by
the Supreme Court was decided in the context of foreign
corporations.84 Despite this context, the framework is applied in
77 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
78 Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014).
79 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). The four cases since are:
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v.
Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011); Helicoptoros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S.
408 (1984); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
80 Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 310.
81 Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. 2846.
82 Daimler, 134 S. Ct. 746.
83 Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851.
84 See cases cited supra note 79.
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the same way to the PA and PLO, which are typically treated
by the courts as unincorporated associations.85
Prior to Goodyear, the Court never used the “essentially
at home” language. In Helicoptoros Nacionales de Colombia
S.A. v. Hall,86 the Court asked whether a defendant’s contact
with a jurisdiction was “continuous and systematic” as the
basis of general jurisdiction. The prior “continuous and
systematic” language as compared to the contemporary
“essentially at home” language was a farther reaching approach
to general jurisdiction. Even so, some Supreme Court justices,
like Justice Brennan, expressed concern that the “continuous
and systematic” standard was not expansive enough. In
Helicopotoros, Justice Brennan dissented from the “continuous
and systematic” standard, saying that the Court had placed too
“severe limitations on the type and amount of contacts that will
satisfy the constitutional minimum,”87 especially given “[t]he
vast expansion of our national [interests] during the past several
decades [which] has provided the primary rationale for expanding
the permissible reach of a State’s jurisdiction.”88 Ultimately, Justice
Brennan’s view did not prevail, and the Court has moved away
from even a moderately expansive view of general jurisdiction with
the adoption of itsGoodyear/Daimler framework.
The current general jurisdiction framework was first
articulated in Goodyear and then expanded upon in Daimler.
In Goodyear, two thirteen-year-old boys from North Carolina
were killed while abroad in France when Goodyear tires,
manufactured in Turkey, catastrophically failed and caused their
bus to crash while the boys were traveling to the airport.89 The
plaintiffs sued Goodyear, an American corporation, and its foreign
subsidiaries in North Carolina.90 Even though Goodyear’s foreign
subsidiaries had their products enter “the stream of commerce”91
and could be found in American markets, the court held that
Goodyear’s subsidiaries were not subject to general jurisdiction
in United States courts.92 The Supreme Court explained that
85 See supra notes 48–53 and accompanying text.
86 Helicoptoros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
87 Id. at 420.
88 Id. at 422.
89 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011).
90 Brown v. Meter, No. 05 CVS 1922, 2008 WL 8187601 (N.C. Apr. 25, 2008).
While Goodyear’s foreign subsidiaries appealed the court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction
over them in Goodyear, Goodyear USA, an American corporation, did not contest the court’s
exercise of personal jurisdiction over it. See Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851–52.
91 See Worldwide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297–98 (1980)
(holding that placing an item “into the stream of commerce” is only sufficient if the
defendant expected his product to be purchased in the ultimate forum state).
92 Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851.
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“[a] court may assert general jurisdiction over
foreign . . . corporations to hear any and all claims against them
when their affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and
systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum
State.”93 The court went on to explain that “[a] connection so
limited [like stream of commerce] . . . is an inadequate basis for
the exercise of general jurisdiction.”94 According to the Court,
such attenuated connections are insufficient as proof that a
defendant is “essentially at home” in a forum sufficient to subject
them to answer “claims unrelated to anything that connects them
to the State.”95 This more stringent “essentially at home” standard
protects defendants who otherwise would not expect to litigate in
foreign jurisdictions and represents a growing concern for
international comity in an increasingly globalizing world.96
The Court made its most recent comment on general
jurisdiction in Daimler AG v. Bauman.97 In Daimler, twenty-
two Argentinians filed suit in United States District Court for
the Northern District of California against Daimler, a German
corporation, based on alleged collaboration between Mercedes
Benz-Argentina, a subsidiary of Daimler, and Argentinian
security forces during Argentina’s “Dirty War” to “kidnap,
detain, torture, and kill” Mercedes Benz-Argentina workers.98
Plaintiffs claimed jurisdiction over Daimler in the Northern
District of California was proper because Mercedes Benz USA,
LLC, another Daimler subsidiary, distributed Daimler-
manufactured vehicles throughout the United States.99 Even
though Daimler conducts 2.4% of its worldwide sales, or $4.6
billion of business in California alone, the court concluded it was
not subject to general jurisdiction in this forum.100
The Supreme Court explained, “Goodyear made clear
that only a limited set of affiliations . . . will render a defendant
amenable to [general] jurisdiction.”101 The Daimler plaintiffs
advocated for the “exercise of general jurisdiction in every
State in which a corporation ‘engages in a substantial,
continuous, and systematic course of business’” but the Court
93 Id. at 2851 (emphasis added).
94 Id.
95 Id. at 2857.
96 See infra notes 107–111 and accompanying text discussing the Supreme
Court’s articulated concern for international comity.
97 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
98 Id. at 751; see Dirty War, ENCYC. BRITANNICA (Mar. 20, 2014), https://www.
britannica.com/event/Dirty-War [https://perma.cc/M478-FLPR].
99 Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 751–52.
100 Id. at 766–67.
101 Id. at 760.
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considered such a formulation “unacceptably grasping.”102
Ultimately, the Court said the paradigm for the exercise of
general jurisdiction for an individual “is the individual’s
domicile” and “for a corporation, it is an equivalent place, one
in which the corporation is fairly regarded as at
home. . . . [T]he place of incorporation and principal place of
business.”103 The Court noted however, “Goodyear did not hold
that a corporation may be subject to general jurisdiction only in
a forum where it is incorporated or has its principal place of
business.”104 Thus, there may be some circumstances where a
defendant has such significant contacts with a forum that it
may be subject to general jurisdiction there, but Daimler
implies that this is a very high threshold to meet, as billions of
dollars of business was not significant enough in terms of
contacts with California to render Daimler “essentially at
home” in the Northern District of California.
In Daimler the Court indicated that one of its principal
motivations for its restriction on the availability of general
jurisdiction was the concern for international comity,105 or the
mutual respect and recognition between nations regarding
their various judicial, legislative, and executive enactments.106
The Court explained that “[o]ther nations do not share [the
United States’s] uninhibited approach to [general] jurisdiction,”
and furthermore that “foreign governments’ objections to some
domestic courts’ expansive views of general jurisdiction have in
the past impeded negotiations of international agreements.”107
Thus, with regard to personal jurisdiction, the “Court has
increasingly [focused] on the ‘relationship among the
defendant, the forum, and the litigation’”—meaning that the
Court is more concerned with “specific jurisdiction” while
“general jurisdiction has come to occupy a less dominant place
in the contemporary scheme.”108 In Daimler, the court
reaffirmed its Goodyear holding that the inquiry for general
jurisdiction “is not whether a foreign corporation’s in-forum
contacts can be said to be in some sense ‘continuous and
systematic,’ it is whether that corporation’s ‘affiliations with
the State are so “continuous and systematic” as to render [it]
102 Id. at 761.
103 Id. at 760 (internal citations omitted).
104 Id.
105 Id. at 763.
106 Comity, BLACK’S LAWDICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
107 Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 763.
108 Id. at 758.
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essentially at home in the forum State.’”109 Ultimately, these
cases represent the upward trend of the already exacting
threshold that must be met for a court to exercise general
jurisdiction over a defendant and furthermore exemplifies the
increasingly marginal role of general jurisdiction in modern
jurisprudence. The circumscription of general jurisdiction
creates an issue for bringing state sponsors of terror like the
PA and the PLO into American courts because general
jurisdiction is often the only means through which U.S. courts
can exercise personal jurisdiction over such organizations.110
3. Issues with the Daimler and Goodyear General
Jurisdiction Framework
The Supreme Court’s Daimler/Goodyear framework is
problematic for three main reasons with regard to terrorist
sponsoring organizations like the PA and the PLO. First,
concern for international comity should not be the concern of
the courts, but rather should be handled by elected policy
makers. Even so, any risk or concern for international comity is
minimal at best as the PA and PLO are stateless organizations,
their terror activities attract ire, and the United States does
not recognize a Palestinian state. While other nations recognize
a Palestinian state and may take issue with the United States’
treatment of the PA and PLO in its court system, foreign policy
considerations should be at the nadir of a court’s concerns
when terror victims come into U.S. courts seeking justice for
the horrors they have suffered abroad.111
Second, the Supreme Court has only directly applied
general jurisdiction to corporations and individuals. Exercising
general jurisdiction over unincorporated associations or non-
sovereign state organizations like the PA and PLO could be
considered a case of first impression for the Supreme Court and
thus there is room within the present legal framework to bring
the PA and PLO into American courts without disturbing the
existing Daimler/Goodyear framework. Specifically, an analysis
of the Antiterrorism Act of 1992 (ATA) shows that a restrictive
view of exercising jurisdiction over terrorist defendants runs
counter to Congressional intent. When Congress passed the ATA
in 1992, they did so to give American victims of terror attacks
abroad an avenue for recourse, irrespective of jurisdictional
109 Id. at 761 (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131
S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011)).
110 See supra Section I.B.1.
111 See infra Section I.C.
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hurdles, in American federal courts.112 The court can and should
find a way to give life to this intent.
Third, in Footnote 19 in Daimler the court indicated
“[w]e do not foreclose the possibility that in an exceptional
case . . . a corporation’s operations in a forum other than its
formal place of incorporation or principal place of business may
be so substantial and of such a nature as to render the
corporation at home in that State.”113 The Court went on to say
that Daimler’s $4.2 billion of economic activity “plainly [does]
not approach that level.”114 Although the Court has not
indicated what an “exceptional” case would look like, there are
compelling policy reasons to treat terror cases as “exceptional.”
Americans injured in terror attacks abroad must be afforded an
avenue for recourse in American courts, especially in a post-
9/11 era with more attacks aimed at American and other
Western citizens. The PA and the PLO, as sponsors of terror
activities and in light of their significant lobbying and
fundraising activities in America,115 should be considered
“exceptional” as alluded to in the Daimler footnote. Such a
classification of terror groups or sponsors of terror who lobby,
or even recruit in the United States, would allow district court
judges to exercise general jurisdiction over groups like the PA
and the PLO. District court judges could do so without
disturbing the exceedingly high “at home” standard articulated
in Goodyear and Daimler, and without impacting the Court’s
concern for international comity as no respect need be extended
by our government to those who seek to perpetuate international
terror. The Court’s concern with comity was never to protect
terrorists who kill or maim Americans abroad.116
C. Anti-Terrorism Act of 1992
The Antiterrorism Act of 1992 (ATA) was passed to
remove jurisdictional hurdles for terror victims to bring their
attackers into American courts, but the recent treatment of
general jurisdiction by the D.C. District Court has proven fatal
to this statute. The ATA permits “[a]ny national of the United
States injured in his or her person, . . . by . . . an act of
112 See infra Section I.C.
113 Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761 n.19 (internal citations omitted).
114 Id.
115 Waldman v. Palestine Liberation Org., 835 F.3d 317, 323 (2d Cir. 2016).
116 See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 763 (offering international comity as a rationale
for a restrictive holding on general jurisdiction); see also Perkins v. Benguet Consol.
Mining Corp., 342 U.S. 437, 444–45 (1952) (The concern with general jurisdiction has
always been a concern regarding fairness to the corporation.).
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international terrorism . . . [to] sue . . . in any appropriate
district court of the United States” in any district where the
plaintiff resides.117 A court will only dismiss an action brought
under the ATA for inconvenience if “the action may be
maintained in a foreign court . . . [and] that foreign court is
significantly more convenient . . . and . . . offers a remedy
which is substantially the same as the one available in
the . . . United States.”118 The ATA makes it exceedingly
difficult for a defendant involved in a terror case to have a case
removed from American courts because the statute requires: (1)
a foreign court have jurisdiction; (2) that the court be
significantly more convenient; and (3) that the foreign court’s
available remedy be almost identical to that which would be
available in a United States District Court.119 As the ATA
provides for treble damages, inclusive of court costs and interest,
it is unlikely that a plaintiff will find a remedy almost identical to
that which would be available in a U.S. court. Congress
intentionally created an onerous removal framework so American
terror victims would have the ability to file their cases in
American courts and litigate their cases where it is convenient for
them to do so, not their terrorist attackers or their sponsors.
In addition to removing jurisdictional hurdles for
American citizens,120 Congress passed the ATA to provide
victims with significant money damages.121 Senator Grassley,
one of the bill’s main advocates, indicated the intent of the ATA
is to allow American victims of terror to bring the terrorists
into court for money damages.122 He noted that money damages
are essential to the ATA not only to compensate the victim, but
also because syphoning money from terror organizations
strikes at their lifeblood and has the potential to put them out
of business.123 To that end, the ATA’s allowance for plaintiffs to
receive treble damages, to recover the costs of their suit, and
receive attorney’s fees advances this goal.124 Additionally,
damages awards are provided to plaintiffs with interest and
thus, in consideration of the often decades-long trajectory of
117 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (2012).
118 Id. § 2334(d) (emphasis added).
119 Id.
120 The ATA provides for treble damages as well as recovery of court costs and
attorneys fees in any actions pursued under this statute. See id. § 2333(a).
121 137 CONG. REC. 3304 (1991) (statement of Sen. Grassley) (“The Anti-Terrorism
Act removes the jurisdictional hurdles in the courts confronting victims and it empowers
victims with all the weapons available in civil litigation.”).
122 138 CONG. REC. 33,628–29 (1992) (statements of Sen. Grassley).
123 Id. at 33,629.
124 Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (2012).
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terror litigation, interest on damages awards is often
substantial.125 The ATA’s damages award structure has allowed
for plaintiffs to recover significant sums of money, like in
Sokolow, where the damages, trebled and with interest, will
likely be as much as $1.1 billion, or close to a third of the PA’s
operating budget.126 In fact, the damages award to the forty
plaintiffs in Sokolow was so substantial the Obama
Administration considered intervening to ask the court to
consider reducing the award.127
Interestingly, the ATA was initially advocated for in
response to an act of terror perpetrated by the PLO in 1985.128
In Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro,129 Palestinian terrorists
seized the Achille Lauro, an Italian passenger liner sailing in
the Mediterranean Sea, and shot a handicapped sixty-nine-
year-old Jewish-American passenger, Leon Klinghoffer, while
he was on vacation with his wife and their family friends.130
During the hijacking, four PLO hijackers separated Klingoffer
from his wife, shot him, and then threw him and his
wheelchair overboard.131 Klinghoffer’s wife sued the PLO in the
Southern District of New York, which ruled they could exercise
jurisdiction over the PLO.132 When discussing the ATA at a
session of Congress in 1991, Senator Grassley referenced
Klinghoffer saying “[l]ast June a New York Federal District
Court ruled . . . that the U.S. courts have jurisdiction over the
PLO. The New York court set the precedent; [the ATA] would
codify that ruling and make[] the right of American victims
definitive.”133 Congress passed the ATA with the specific
purpose of removing the jurisdictional hurdles that would
otherwise prevent American victims of terror from an avenue of
recourse against their attackers, but Daimler and Goodyear
have interfered with that goal.
125 See, e.g., Singman, supra note 17.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 138 CONG. REC. 33,628–29 (1992) (statements of Sen. Grassley).
129 Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 739 F. Supp. 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
130 William E. Smith, Terrorism: The Voyage of the Achille Lauro, TIMES (Oct.
21, 1985), http://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,960163-1,00.html [https://
perma.cc/RUZ2-MXLW] (noting Leon Klinghoffer was sixty-nine). The article recounts
the shooting of Klinghoffer from the perspective of then Italian Ambassador to Egypt,
Giovanni Migliuolo. Migliuolo describes, “The hijackers pushed (Klinghoffer) in his chair
and dragged him to the side of the ship, where, in cold blood, they fired a shot to the
forehead. Then they dumped the body into the sea, together with the wheelchair.” Id.
131 Klinghoffer, 937 F.2d at 47; see Klinghoffer, 739 F. Supp. at 856.
132 Klinghoffer, 739 F. Supp. at 863; see also Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille
Lauro, 795 F. Supp. 112, 114 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
133 Gill v. Arab Bank, PLC, 893 F. Supp. 2d 474, 495 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting
137 CONG. REC. 8143 (1991) (statements of Sen. Grassley) (emphasis omitted)).
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While the ATA was intended as a broad remedy for
Americans injured or killed by terrorist attacks abroad, the
ATA remained virtually unused until the post-September 11th
era.134 In Boim v. Quranic Literacy Institute & Holy Land
Foundation,135 the parents of a seventeen-year-old, David Boim,
filed a lawsuit in the Northern District of Illinois following an
attack in which their son was gunned down while visiting the
West Bank. The Boim family sued not only the terrorist
attackers, but also the charity groups that funded the
terrorists, claiming they were front organizations for the terror
group Hamas.136 The Boim case was the first to assert liability
for organizations under the ATA “based solely upon the
defendants’ knowledge that their funds were being used to
conduct acts of international terrorism.”137
Boim was appealed to the Seventh Circuit, which
convened to hear argument on the issue two weeks after the
September 11, 2001 attacks.138 The Court found the ATA was
intended “to extend civil liability for acts of international
terrorism to the full reaches of traditional tort law.”139 The
court held the ATA “should be interpreted in light of Congress’s
subsequent enactment of [18 U.S.C. § 2339A, a criminal statute
that] outlaws the provision of material support to any
international terrorist group or terrorist act.”140 Therefore, the
Seventh Circuit determined that providing financial support to
terrorists, so long as the donor has some “knowledge of and intent
to further the [terrorist-]payee’s violent criminal acts,” creates
liability under the ATA.141 The ATA not only affords jurisdiction
over defendants who commit terrorist attacks themselves, but
also, together with the necessary scienter requirement, allows
plaintiffs to reach entities a step removed from the attack so long
as those entities realize the money they are providing to
organizations may be used to fund an act of terrorism.142 Boim
clearly established that the ATA allows plaintiffs to reach both
their terrorist attackers and sponsors of terrorism.
134 John D. Shipman, Taking Terrorism to Court: A Legal Examination of the
New Front in the War on Terrorism, 86 N.C. L. REV. 526, 536 (2008).
135 Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst. & Holy Land Found., 291 F.3d 1000 (7th
Cir. 2002).
136 Shipman, supra note 134, at 537.
137 Id.
138 Boim, 291 F.3d at 1000.
139 Id. at 1010.
140 Shipman, supra note 134, at 538 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted).
141 Id. at 539.
142 Id. at 538.
2016] IF WE DON’T BRING THEM TO COURT 379
Prior to Daimler and Goodyear, the ATA and the
“continuous and systematic” general jurisdiction framework
worked in concert with each other. In fact, in Estate of Klieman
and Livnat, the D.C. District Court judges exercised general
jurisdiction against the PA and the PLO in lawsuits brought
under the ATA. In the opinions, the judges found that the PA
and PLO had “‘continuous and systematic’ contacts with the
United States”143 sufficient to exercise general jurisdiction over
both entities.
Daimler, according to the D.C. District Court, represented
an intervening change in the law such that they could no longer
say, under the “essentially at home” standard that the PA and
PLO were subject to the general jurisdiction of United States
District Courts. For instance in Estate of Klieman, the circuit
court held that despite its previous decision that it could exercise
general jurisdiction over the PA and PLO, Daimler constituted
an intervening change in the law; thus, the PA and PLO are
not “essentially at home” in the United States and therefore
not subject to its jurisdiction.144
Despite the broad intended reach of the ATA, as
evidenced by its legislative history,145 the Supreme Court’s
decision in Daimler has weakened the reach and scope of the
ATA and therefore has made it more difficult for American
victims to bring their attackers and those who supported their
attackers to justice. It is especially important for Americans to
be able to bring sponsors of terror into court—rather than the
terrorists themselves—because it is the sponsor organizations
who most likely have the deepest pockets and the greatest
ability to pay the significant damages awards that can be
levied under the ATA.
II. DISTRICT COURT APPLICATIONS OF THE
DAIMLER/GOODYEAR FRAMEWORK
The Southern District of New York and the D.C. District
Court have taken conflicting stances on the Goodyear/Daimler
framework with regard to the PA and the PLO. While the
Southern District of New York, in consideration of Daimler,
143 Estate of Klieman v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 237, 239, 250
(D.D.C. 2015) (holding Daimler’s “at home” test constituted an intervening change in
the law sufficient to deprive the court of its previously established personal jurisdiction
over the PA and the PLO).
144 Id. at 250.
145 See supra note 133 and surrounding text. It is clear Congress remains
steadfastly in favor of allowing American terror victims to sue their attackers and their
sponsors in U.S. courts as evidenced by the recent passage of JASTA. See supra note 2.
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has found a way to continue to exercise general jurisdiction
over the PA and PLO in terror cases,146 the District Court for
the District of Columbia has said Daimler prevents its courts
from exercising general jurisdiction over these organizations.147
As this part explains, ultimately, the Southern District reached
the right result, but for the wrong reasons.148
A. The Southern District of New York Approach
The Southern District of New York has found the
exercise of general jurisdiction over the PA and PLO to be
appropriate despite the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in
Daimler and Goodyear.149 The Southern District’s approach
treats terrorism cases pursuant to the ATA as such “exceptional
cases” that were alluded to in Daimler150 and says that the PA
and PLO—which are treated as unincorporated associations by
United States District Courts—are not subject to the typical
general jurisdiction analysis.151
In Sokolow v. Palestine Liberation Organization, Judge
Daniels recognized that “[p]rior to . . . Daimler . . . . [t]his
Court . . . ‘agree[d] with every federal court to have considered
the issue that the totality of activities in the United States by
the PLO and the PA justifie[d] the exercise of general personal
jurisdiction.’”152 Judge Daniels expressed understanding that
Daimler raised concerns regarding the “risks to international
comity” created by an expansive view of general jurisdiction,
but said there is no concern with international comity
presented by terrorism cases pursuant to the ATA against the
PA and the PLO because these cases do “not conflict with any
foreign country’s applicable law or sovereign interests, nor is it
in contravention of the laws of any foreign country.”153 Judge
146 See Sokolow v. Palestine Liberation Org., No. 04 Civ 397(GBD), 2014 WL
6811395, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2014).
147 See Estate of Klieman, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 250.
148 A critique of the Southern District of New York’s approach will be offered
infra in Section II.A of this note.
149 See Sokolow, 2014 WL 6811395, at *2. While the Supreme Court, of course,
is binding on the Southern District of New York, the Southern District has found ways
to sidestep the Daimler framework that will be discussed in the rest of this section.
150 See supra text accompanying notes 123–126.
151 Sokolow, 2014 WL 6811395, at *2.
152 Id. at *1 (third and fourth alteration in original) (internal citation omitted).
153 Id. at *1–2. This argument of course seems premised on the fact that the
United States does not recognize a Palestinian state. Should the United States begin to
do so, which seems unlikely, Judge Daniels’s comity analysis would be fundamentally
altered as it would subject the government of the Palestinian people to litigation in
American courts. Recognizing this weakness in Judge Daniels’s argument, I will proceed
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Daniels held that the Southern District has jurisdiction over
the PA and the PLO pursuant to the ATA because the instant
suit “presents such ‘an exceptional case,’ as alluded to in
Daimler.”154 He continued to observe that the “[PA and PLO] by
their own admission are not . . . corporations and therefore are
not subject to the traditional [jurisdiction] analysis.”155 Rather,
by treating cases involving stateless agents like the PA and the
PLO, who sponsor terror activities abroad and conduct business
in the United States, as “exceptional” under Daimler, a court can
conclude that “the PA and PLO’s continuous and systematic
business and commercial contacts within the United States are
sufficient to support the exercise of general jurisdiction.”156
Furthermore, Judge Daniels keenly observed the fact that
technically, in the eyes of the United States, the PA and the
PLO are not “at home” anywhere and thus are as much “at
home” in the United States as they are anywhere else.157
Judge Daniels’s approach is justified in its end but
incorrect in its means. To hold any group or organization
without a formal home as “at home” in the United States if it
conducts some business here is an overly expansive view of
general jurisdiction and contradicts the Supreme Court’s move
towards narrowed applications of the general jurisdiction
framework. His approach ignores the fact that American courts
are able to establish personal jurisdiction over the PA and the
PLO, but they do so in the specific jurisdiction context with the
PA and PLO classified as unincorporated associations or non-
sovereign state organizations. In the specific jurisdiction
context, the former classification allows for unincorporated
associations to be sued and served wherever they have
members. Livnat suggests the latter classification, non-
sovereign government organizations, can be sued only under a
theory of specific jurisdiction because they generally are not at
home in the United States.158 The Supreme Court has not
commented specifically on how unincorporated associations or
non-sovereign state organizations should be treated in the
general jurisdiction context. As stated in Section I.A of this
note, classified as either type of organization, the PA and PLO
are not subject to personal jurisdiction in the United States.
on the assumption that the United States will not recognize a Palestinian state in the
foreseeable future.
154 Sokolow, 2014 WL 6811395, at *1–2.
155 Id. at *2.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 It is possible but rare and unusual for a foreign government to be at home in
the United States. Livnat v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 19, 30 n.12 (D.D.C. 2015).
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Judge Daniel’s instinct to use the “exceptional” case footnote
was correct, but he should have instead advocated for the PA
and the PLO to be treated as among an “exceptional” class of
organizations that conduct lobbying activities in the United
States—but otherwise lack a state or domicile—and use some
portion of their funds to sponsor terrorist activities abroad that
have injured American citizens. By classifying the PA and PLO
as “exceptional,” United States courts could treat stateless
sponsors of terror who conduct business activity in the United
States as an exception under Daimler sufficient for courts to give
effect to the ATA and provide relief for Americans at home in
United States courts.159
B. The D.C. District Court’s Approach
Several D.C. District Court judges have disagreed with
the Southern District’s treatment of Daimler as applied to the
PLO and the PA in Sokolow. In Klieman, Judge Friedman
disagreed with the Southern District, saying, “[i]t is not a
defendants’ burden to demonstrate a ‘home’ outside the United
State[s], but the plaintiffs’ burden to present a prima facie case
that defendants are ‘at home’ in the United States.”160 Specifically,
Judge Friedman said, “the PA and the PLO[’ s] . . . contacts with
the United States are not so continuous or systematic as to render
them ‘essentially at home’”161 and thus the District Court had no
grounds upon which to exercise general jurisdiction. While the
D.C. judge correctly applied Daimler in form, in substance, Judge
Friedman’s approach would doom cases to dismissal whenever
plaintiffs attempt to litigate against the PA and the PLO. In the
eyes of the United States, these organizations have no home or
state and thus it would be impossible for a plaintiff to meet his
burden and prove where either organization is “at home.”
Judge Daniels avoided this inevitability by taking a negative-
space approach to Daimler’s “essentially at home” analysis that
seems well-suited to these types of cases. The D.C. District Court
responded directly to Judge Daniel’s argument that the PA and
PLO are not “at home” anywhere162 by arguing, without any
concern for United States policy against recognizing a Palestinian
159 See supra Section I.C.
160 Estate of Klieman v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 237, 246 (D.D.C. 2015).
161 Id. at 250.
162 See id.
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state,163 that the common sense treatment of where the PA and
the PLO are “at home” is in Palestine as their names suggest.164
Soon after Judge Friedman dismissed Klieman, Judge
Kollar-Kotelly dismissed Livnat, a similar decades-old
terrorism case brought under the ATA using the post-Daimler
framework. In Livnat v. Palestinian Authority, U.S. citizens
were killed and injured following an attack at a Jewish holy site
that was “carried out . . . by Palestinian Authority . . . security
personnel.”165 Judge Kollar-Kotelly dismissed the case with
prejudice explaining that despite the fact that the Supreme
Court has not specifically discussed the application of general
jurisdiction beyond individuals and corporations, it is clear that
both Daimler and Goodyear should apply beyond these two
entities because the court used general language to describe the
necessary contacts a corporation or individual would have to
embody in order to satisfy Daimler’s “at home test.”166
This approach makes intuitive sense, because it
encourages parity in how personal jurisdiction, whether general
or specific, is applied across all types of jurisdictions. Courts
should not exempt entire classes of associations from the general
jurisdiction test simply because the Supreme Court has not had
the opportunity to speak on how the test would apply to those
types associations. Even so, had Judge Kollar-Kotelly ruled to
exercise jurisdiction over the PA and PLO because the Supreme
Court has been silent on how general jurisdiction applies to
unincorporated associations and non-sovereign state organizations,
she could have honored Congressional intent to ease jurisdictional
hurdles in the terrorism litigation context and held in favor of the
plaintiffs. Such a ruling would also highlight the perceived gap in
procedural law so that Congress and the Supreme Court could
better identify and address it in the future.
In the same opinion, Judge Kollar-Kotelly challenged
the convention of treating the PA and PLO as unincorporated
associations. She held that the PA and PLO should be treated
as non-sovereign state organizations,167 and pointed to precedent
163 In a recent vote at the UN, the United States exercised its veto power to vote
against Palestinian statehood. Louis Charbonneau, Palestinian Statehood Resolution
Fails at U.N. Council, U.S. Votes Against, REUTERS (Dec. 31, 2014), http://www.reuters.
com/article/us-mideast-palestinians-un-idUSKBN0K81CR20141231 [https://perma.cc/ME
44-7DVU].
164 Livnat v. Palestinian Auth., 82. F. Supp. 3d 19, 31 (D.D.C. 2015).
165 Livnat, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 20–21.
166 Id. at 28 (“While the Supreme Court did not enumerate paradigm all-purpose
forums for other types of organizations, the Supreme Court never suggested that this
particular inquiry would be any different for a defendant that was neither an individual
nor a corporation.”).
167 Id. at 26.
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for such a classification. In Toumazou v. Turkish Republic of
North Cyprus,168 a D.C. district judge concluded that the Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus was “at home” where its name
suggests—in Northern Cyprus—despite its lack of a
corresponding state.169 Based on this analysis, Judge Kollar-
Kotelly concluded the PA and PLO “should be amenable to suit
for all purposes [in] the place where it governs. . . . [T]he West
Bank, not the United States.”170 If other courts and judges were
to adopt Judge Kollar-Kotelly’s classification, they could treat
the much narrower question of how general jurisdiction applies
to non-sovereign state organizations as a matter of first
impression rather than dealing with the more sweeping
question of how general jurisdiction applies to unincorporated
associations. While treating the PA and the PLO as unincorporated
associations has proven workable and would continue to be as a
matter of first impression in the general jurisdiction context,
treating the PA and the PLO as non-sovereign state organizations
would make more sense because not only is that precisely what
they are, but using this narrow class of organization would also do
less to disturb the court’s winnowing general jurisdiction
framework. Additionally, this classification would put any future
non-sovereign state organizations on notice by making it know how
they will be treated by American courts if they seek to carry out
violent and terroristic activities to achieve their ends, whatever
they may be.
C. Comparing the Southern District of New York’s and D.C.
District’s Approaches
The disparate treatments of Daimler by the Southern
District of New York and the D.C. District fail to provide the
predictable framework for terror-victim lawsuits Congress
intended when it passed the ATA. Where the Southern District
considers the PA and PLO as without a home, the D.C. District
argues first that it is the plaintiff’s burden to prove they are “at
home” in the United States, and second, that they are “at home”
in Palestine, as their names would suggest, and therefore not
subject to general jurisdiction in the United States. The burden
the D.C. District places on plaintiffs would require the court to
dismiss a plaintiff’s case against the PA and the PLO because it
168 Toumazou v. Turkish Republic of North Cyprus, 71 F. Supp. 3d 7
(D.D.C. 2014).
169 Id. at 15.
170 Livnat, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 30. Notably, the West Bank is not where the names
of the PA or PLO suggest their homes should be.
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is an impossible task for a plaintiff to prove the PA and the
PLO are “at home” anywhere when indeed, as the Southern
District suggests, they technically are “at home” nowhere. The
Southern District—recognizing this procedural hurdle and
perhaps in recognition of the Congressional intent motivating
the ATA—appropriately sought to continue the line of pre-
Daimler general jurisdiction decisions which found courts could
exercise personal jurisdiction over the PA and the PLO.171
Additionally, the Southern District approach ensures American
plaintiffs can find relief and receive justice at home.
Furthermore, while the Southern District highlights
that the Supreme Court has failed to address the applicability
of general jurisdiction to non-individual, non-corporate entities,
the D.C. judges have indicated there is no reason to presume
Daimler was intended to be so limited given the broad
language the Supreme Court used when discussing general
jurisdiction in Daimler and Goodyear.172 Here, the D.C. judges
are likely correct that unincorporated associations are
encompassed by the general jurisdiction framework, but that is
not fatal to exercising general jurisdiction over organizations that
conduct business in the United States and sponsor terrorist
activities that may injure Americans abroad. Even so, how
unincorporated associations are treated in the general jurisdiction
context will remain an open question until the Supreme Court
takes up the question. Even if the Supreme Court does, it is
unlikely they would treat general jurisdiction more expansively
with regard to unincorporated associations. However, the D.C.
district judges’ suggestion that courts treat the PA and the PLO
as non-sovereign state organizations presents an interesting
opportunity. The Supreme Court could create precedent that non-
sovereign state organizations are not “at home” where their
names would suggest because, being governments without states,
they are not “at home” anywhere, as Judge Daniels in the
Southern District suggested.
The D.C. judges’ critique of the Southern District
approach is incomplete. The D.C. judges failed to address the
Southern District’s compelling argument that terrorism cases
171 See Sokolow v. Palestine Liberation Org., No. 04 Civ 397(GBD), 2014 WL
6811395, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2014) (reasoning that “[p]rior to . . . Daimler . . . This
Court . . . ‘agree[d] with every federal court to have considered the issue that the totality
of activities in the United States by the PLO and the PA justifie[d] the exercise of general
personal jurisdiction’” (third and fourth alteration in original)). But see Estate of Klieman
v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 237, 250 (D.D.C. 2015) (holding Daimler’s “at home”
test constituted an intervening change in the law sufficient to deprive the court of its
previously established personal jurisdiction over the PA and the PLO).
172 See supra text accompanying note 166.
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under the ATA are exceptional cases pursuant to Footnote 19
in Daimler.173 In Daimler, the Supreme Court indicated, “[w]e
do not foreclose the possibility that in an exceptional case a
corporation’s operations in a forum other than its formal place
of incorporation or principal place of business may be so
substantial and of such a nature as to render the corporation at
home in that State.”174 The Supreme Court failed to define what
such an exceptional case would look like, but at least—it
seems—in the business context, the standard is exceedingly
high.175 However, in light of Congressional intent surrounding
the passage of the ATA176 and the general desire to allow victims
of terror to hold sponsors of terror and their attackers accountable
in American courts, policy considerations seem to mandate that
courts classify terror cases as exceptional pursuant to Footnote 19
of Daimler. By doing so, courts would not further injure American
plaintiffs by dismissing with prejudice their cases against their
terror attackers and those who sponsor them.
The unfortunate reality is, when American plaintiffs have
their cases dismissed with prejudice abroad, these holdings often,
but not always, have a res judicata effect in other international
courts.177 Thus, Ms. Klieman’s estate will never be made whole
following the fatal machine gun attack that killed her while she
was riding a public bus in Israel, nor will the Livnat estate be
made whole after members of the Palestinian Authority killed
American citizens abroad during an attack of a Jewish holy site.
As stated during Congressional hearings on the ATA, the
purpose of this statute is not only to compensate plaintiffs who
have been injured or killed at the hands of terrorists or sponsors
of terror, but also to cut away the lifeblood of terrorists by taking
away their money.178 It is precisely this deliberate framework that
made possible the rendering of a potentially $1.15 billion
judgment against the PA and the PLO for the forty or so
Americans who were horribly maimed or killed in Sokolow.179
173 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 761 n.19 (2014) (internal
citations omitted).
174 Id. (emphasis added).
175 See supra text accompanying notes 86–88.
176 See supra Section I.C.
177 See Enforcement of Judgments, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE BUREAU OF CONSULAR
AFFAIRS, http://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/legal-considerations/judicial/enforcement-o
f-judgments.html [https://perma.cc/HL2B-CME3].
178 See supra Section I.C (which is in part why the ATA affords trebled damages,
attorney’s fees, and court costs).
179 See supra text accompanying notes 126–127.
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III. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THEGOODYEAR/DAIMLER “AT
HOME” PROBLEM
With the above in mind, there are two potential solutions
to the problem the Goodyear/Daimler general jurisdiction
framework has caused for Americans seeking to bring terrorists
and sponsors of terrorism into American courts pursuant to the
ATA. First, courts could conclude as a matter of law that
unincorporated associations or non-sovereign state organizations
that have operations in the United States and sponsor terror are
subject to general jurisdiction in American courts. The second,
stronger, and more parsimonious solution would be to rely on
Footnote 19 in Daimler and treat terror cases as precisely the
type of exceptional case to which the Supreme Court alluded.
This would allow the Supreme Court to give effect to its concern
for comity in the business and individual context while still
allowing district courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over
groups that terrorize Americans abroad like the PA and the
PLO. As it stands, the Supreme Court’s holding in Daimler has
frustrated Congress’s intention that the ATA function as a
powerful statute that will ensure Americans who have been
harmed at the hands of foreign terrorists can find justice at
home free of procedural and jurisdictional hurdles.180
A. Limiting the General Jurisdiction Framework to
Corporations and Individuals
In Daimler, the Supreme Court explained the general
jurisdiction paradigm for individuals and for corporations, but
made no comment on how the general jurisdiction framework
would apply to unincorporated associations or non-sovereign
government organizations. The paradigm for the exercise of
general jurisdiction over an individual “is the individual’s
domicile” and for a corporation “is an equivalent place, one in
which the corporation is fairly regarded as at home . . . the place
of incorporation and principal place of business.”181 For reasons
stated above,182 it seems unlikely to conclude unincorporated
associations are excepted from the Goodyear/Daimler framework,
but the Court could easily do so if it wanted to because the
question is still technically open. By treating unincorporated
associations as a matter of first impression for the general
180 See supra Section I.C.
181 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2014).
182 See supra Section II.C.
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jurisdiction framework, the Court could easily modify the general
jurisdiction framework to encompass terrorist defendants and
their sponsors. However, the Court may view this approach as
over-inclusive because partnerships, and unions are also treated
as unincorporated associations and they should not be subject to a
disparate general jurisdiction framework as compared to their
corporate and individual counterparts just so terrorists and their
sponsors can be brought into American courts.
If the Court considers this position too extreme, they can
instead consider the treatment of non-sovereign government
organizations under general jurisdiction as a matter of first
impression. This would be a more circumscribed and workable
approach. In fact, the Southern District of New York suggested
that requiring a plaintiff to prove where a stateless organization
is “at home” is essentially a fool’s errand because it is “at home”
nowhere. This suggests a non-sovereign state could almost never
be hauled into American courts despite a history of jurisprudence
preceding Goodyear and Daimler where American courts
regularly exercised general jurisdiction over non-sovereign
government organizations like the PA and the PLO. By choosing
to classify non-sovereign state organizations as cases of first
impression, courts would grant themselves an opportunity to
avoid reaching the conclusion that cases against the PLO and PA
must be dismissed; a conclusion that runs contrary to the intent
of the ATA.
While simply categorizing the PLO and PA as either
unincorporated associations or non-sovereign state organizations
(and thus dubbing them as cases of first impression), may seem
like a workable solution, there are issues with both of these
approaches. Treating unincorporated associations differently from
individuals and corporations would create an unevenly applied
personal jurisdiction framework where unincorporated entities
like partnerships would be subject to general jurisdiction for
“continues and systematic contacts” but individuals and
corporations could only be subject to general jurisdiction if they
were “essentially at home.” Putting the inconsistent application of
jurisdiction law aside, this solution would do nothing to address
the Supreme Court’s concerns for international comity.
Specifically with regard to non-sovereign government
organizations, an official policy of treating such organizations as
less than sovereign simply because they lack a state would be to
quash fledgling populist movements which are issues of
sovereignty that should be left for individual countries to resolve
themselves. An official judicial policy treating non-sovereign
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states as subject to general jurisdiction where their traditional
sovereign counterparts are not would suggest an inherent
American disproval of such organizations simply because they
lack the formality of a “home.”
B. The “Exceptional Case” Daimler Footnote
The better, simpler solution would be for the courts to
declare that, especially in light of Congressional intent under
the ATA and strong public policy considerations,183 causes of
action against terrorists and their sponsors are the type of
“exceptional case” alluded to in Footnote 19 of Daimler. Again,
the footnote reads, “[w]e do not foreclose the possibility that in
an exceptional case . . . a corporation’s operations in a forum
other than its formal place of incorporation or principal place of
business may be so substantial and of such a nature as to render
the corporation at home in that State.”184 This footnote permits
courts to place certain defendants outside of the Daimler “at
home” framework if they are viewed as “exceptional” cases.
Courts should be free to declare that cases involving the
PA and the PLO and any other similarly situated defendants
who: (1) conduct business in the United States; and (2) sponsor
terrorist activities that incidentally injure Americans abroad,
are “exceptional” for purposes of Footnote 19 of Daimler.
Terrorism should be treated as activity that is “of such a
nature” to effectively render any defendant “at home” in the
United States as a matter of law even if their activities would
not otherwise rise to meet this high threshold. The Supreme
Court’s specific jurisdiction framework already recognizes that
certain “single or occasional acts” may be sufficient to subject a
defendant to specific jurisdiction in a forum, so it would be an
unadventurous corollary to make a parallel extension to
general jurisdiction.185 Daimler was decided relatively recently,
but the “exceptional case” footnote is ripe for use.
Future litigation would allow the Supreme Court to
create a specific framework and craft an “exceptional case”
doctrine. In doing so the Supreme Court could be very specific in
identifying what circumstances will constitute an “exceptional
case” so as to protect the PA and the PLO as well as other
similarly situated defendants from non-terror related litigation.
The doctrine should require that a defendant: (1) direct
183 See supra Section II.C for a discussion of public policy considerations.
184 Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761 n.19.
185 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2853 (2011).
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lobbying or business activities towards the United States (which
do not rise to the “essentially at home” level, an exceedingly high
standard186), and (2) have sponsored or directly carried out a
terror activity that caused injury or death to an American abroad.
This “exceptional case” doctrine would reinvigorate the ATA
despite Daimler and allow American litigants to find justice at
home. This doctrine would do little more than return general
jurisdiction issues in terror litigation back to its pre-
Goodyear/Daimler status quo. In fact, because the Court could
so carefully craft the “exceptional case” doctrine, the
framework could in fact strengthen international comity and
relations by showing other nations that American courts
respect their concerns regarding the far jurisdictional reach of
American courts.
Under this doctrine, only an appropriate class of cases
would meet the Daimler exception, whereas prior to Daimler,
any foreign entity that regularly conducted business in America
could be hailed into United States courts. The “exceptional case”
doctrine would recognize the PA and the PLO as organizations
with some legitimate lobbying and advocacy operations, but
would otherwise hold them strongly accountable for their
unacceptable terrorism or terrorism sponsorship activities.
Additionally, the United States would gain credibility with those
nations that have recognized a Palestinian state by showing the
United States recognizes the PA and the PLO as governing
organizations, but only to the extent that they do not sponsor
activities that injure, maim, or kill Americans abroad—actions
that any organization should have to answer for in American
courts. Without such an exception, Americans will continue to
have their cases dismissed by American courts for want of
personal jurisdiction over defendants like the PA and the PLO.
Our judiciary cannot continue to harm American terror victims
by continuing to deny them justice in American courts.
CONCLUSION
Presently there exists a serious gap in U.S. general
jurisdiction framework; Americans who have suffered enough at
the hands of terrorists and their sponsors are now further injured
in American courts. Without adjustment, the post-Daimler
general jurisdiction framework will prevent Americans from
having the opportunity to be made whole despite suffering serious
harm or death at the hands of terrorists. Congress was clear
186 See supra notes 94–97 and accompanying text.
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when it passed the ATA that it intended the statute to clear
jurisdictional hurdles that could otherwise prevent Americans
from making their attackers, and those who aid them,
accountable in American courts. Beyond its purpose to make
American terror victims whole, the ATA plays an important
role in national security as well. The ATA allows American
plaintiffs to receive treble damages, attorney’s fees, and court
costs, all with interest, in what are often protracted and decades
long litigations. The judgments received pursuant to the ATA can
often number in the hundreds of millions or billions of dollars and
thus strike at the lifeblood of terror groups: their bank accounts.
By attacking the bank accounts of these groups, plaintiffs are able
to cripple their operations, thus limiting their ability to carry out
future terror activities, and possibly put them out of business. It
is clear that Congress continues to intend to allow Americans to
find relief in U.S. courts, as evidenced by its recent passage—over
a presidential veto—of the Saudi terror litigation bill, aptly
named the Justice Against Sponsors of Terror Act.187 While
controversial, this bill ensures all American terror victims have a
place to litigate their claims in U.S. courts despite who or how
powerful the defendant.
Before Goodyear and Daimler, the courts’ general
jurisdiction jurisprudence gave effect to the legislative intent of
the ATA, but in the post Goodyear/Daimler era, courts that
previously and appropriately exercised general jurisdiction
over the PA and the PLO now deny to do so. Treating Goodyear
and Daimler as an intervening change in the law, these courts
have concluded Goodyear and Daimler deprive them of
jurisdiction in cases they previously heard and rendered
judgment in. Consequently, courts have been forced to dismiss
cases brought under the ATA with prejudice, leaving plaintiffs
without remedy not only in United States courts, but also in other
international forums. The Southern District of New York has
sidestepped the Supreme Court’s Daimler ruling, but the
Supreme Court or Congress must take action to ensure
Americans nationwide can find relief at home after falling victim
to the horrors of terrorism. Creating an “exceptional case”
doctrine pursuant to Daimler Footnote 19 would prevent the
187 Patricia Zengerle, Congress Rejects Obama Veto, Saudi September 11 Bill
Becomes Law, REUTERS (Sept. 30, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-sept11-
saudi-idUSKCN11Y2D1 [https://perma.cc/AFD6-X586] (The Senate voted in favor of this bill
97–1 with Senator Reid delivering the only no vote. Even Senator Schumber, one of
Obama’s strongest supporters in the Senate said, “[o]verriding a presidential veto is
something we don’t take lightly, but it was important in this case that the families of the
victims of 9/11 be allowed to pursue justice, even if that pursuit causes some diplomatic
discomforts.”).
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inconsistent administration of justice by U.S. courts and would
help plug this troubling hole in our current general jurisdiction
framework. With the continued rise of international terrorism
aimed at America and other Western democracies, our courts
must place justice for American terror victims, who have been
injured, maimed, or killed abroad, among their highest priorities.
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